Training an Iraqi army...

At the Iowa Straw Poll a few weeks ago, just about every Republican presidential candidate who mentioned the war in Iraq cited an op-ed piece in the "liberal" New York Times written by two military analysts from the "liberal" Brookings Institution. They had just returned from a brief tour of Iraq where they saw many of the same things I saw on a similar trip in June. They saw the success our military has had in turning Sunni tribes against extremists from al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) but then extrapolated wildly, saying this was a war we "just might win." Predictably, this had the impact of crack cocaine on neoconservatives, producing a euphoric and slightly violent high. The conservative Weekly Standard scurrilously announced that it had helped dash the "hope" of war opponents that Iraq was lost. The op-ed will be cited continually in the discussion of the war that will accompany the September reports of General David Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker. Which is too bad, because it is fundamentally misleading about the next stage of the war.

To be sure, the success in the Sunni areas is real, but it may have greater long-term significance in the region than it does in Iraq. We've learned an important lesson in Anbar province: the Islamic-extremist message is a loser. Most Muslims do not want to live without music, television and, especially, tobacco. They don't want their daughters forcibly married to jihadis or their sons shrouded in explosive vests. That is certainly good news, but it's not enough. Indeed, the campaign against AQI may be among the last useful missions for the U.S. military in Iraq. We could drive out every last Islamic extremist, and the country would still be in the midst of a civil war that is trending toward chaos. And make no mistake: the U.S. colonialist insistence on dictating the shape of Iraq's future — framing a constitution, training an Iraqi army and the threat of a permanent U.S. military presence — has exacerbated the chaos.

It has been clear for months that Nouri al-Maliki's National Unity government is, as a senior U.S. official said, "none of the above." Senator Carl Levin called for it to be replaced after his and Senator John Warner's mid-August Iraq jaunt. And Ambassador Ryan Crocker told me, "The fall of the Maliki government, when it happens, might be a good thing." But replace it with what? The consensus in the U.S. intelligence community is that there's going to be lots of bloodshed, including fighting among the Shi'ites, before a credible Iraqi government emerges. It also seems that the U.S. attempt to build an Iraqi army and police force has been a failure. Some units are pretty good, but most are unreliable, laced with members of various Shi'ite militias. This was clear from my conversations with U.S. combat officers on the ground in Baqubah, Baghdad and Yusufia. It became clearer when seven enlisted men serving in Baghdad wrote a very courageous Op-Ed piece in the New York Times on Aug. 19 in which they said, "Reports that a majority of Iraqi army commanders are now reliable partners can be considered only misleading rhetoric."

The military success against al-Qaeda in Anbar province has led to a certain incoherence in U.S. policy. We are working bottom up, from the tribal grass roots, with the Sunnis ... but top down, and not very successfully, with the Shi'ite majority. According to Crocker, tribes aren't as important among the Shi'ites, who tend to organize themselves in larger structures, especially around two dominant political families, the Sadrs and the Hakims. Each family has a militia. The Sadrs have the Mahdi Army, and the Hakims have the Badr Corps, and these two forces are now at war with each other in southern Iraq. In recent weeks, Hakim-leaning governors of two provinces were assassinated, most likely by special units associated with the Mahdi Army.

In the southern port city of Basra, the situation is complicated by a third party, Fadhila, which controls the local government. Basra may just be a metaphor for Iraq right now. There is no possible role for the U.S. military in the dispute there. The British are leaving, and the intra-Shi'ite battle is ramping up. The Iranians are trying to play all sides. "Under a different set of circumstances, you might argue — as some are now doing — that we need a Basra surge," Crocker told me. "But you'd need a fairly large force, and we don't have the troops. And if we even proposed it, the political element in the U.S. would go nuts."

The next leader of Iraq and the shape of the next Iraqi government and its armed forces will probably be determined by how the Sadr-Hakim battle turns out, as will the decision about how or whether to reconcile with the Sunnis. The Kurds will prefer the aristocratic Hakims to the populist Sadrs, and so will we. But aristocrats seldom win battles of this sort; a strongman who is no fan of democracy or the West might emerge. In any case, the choice will be made by the Iraqis, not us.
by David Furst

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the Sunni-Shi'a Peace

Pleasantries have barely been exchanged — the tea hasn't even been served — before Haji Kaadam Jabbar Hamsa al-Qarghuli lets Lieutenant Colonel Andrew Rohling have it. "I am very angry," says the leader of one of the area's Qarghuli tribes to the commander of the U.S. Army unit in charge of the area surrounding the town of Yusufiyah, which is about 10 miles south of Baghdad. "We are trying to work together," he says, "but dignity comes first."

The colonel had known this was coming. He is here to soothe some tensions that have broken out between the Shi'a-dominated Iraqi Army and the local, Sunni-dominated Sons of Iraq armed security organizations that the U.S. Army also supports. While the area has enjoyed a striking decline in overall violence over the past year, Colonel Rohling now spends an increasing amount of time managing the complex and fragile relationships that have made this peace possible — and making sure this detente does not unravel every time a partisan crime is committed.

The most recent crime the colonel is dealing with was particularly provocative. On May 14, a woman passed several Sons of Iraq checkpoints as she made her way to the front gate of an Iraqi Army patrol base. She asked to see the company's commander, Captain Wassim Abdul Hadi Saaud al-Sertani. She was a suicide bomber and when the commander arrived, she detonated her explosive vest and killed him and herself.

The event set off waves of accusations and recriminations. Convinced that the Sons of Iraq were to blame for lax security, if not for active participation in the plot, Captain Sertani's men fanned out immediately after the blast, roughing up Sons of Iraq members and hauling several into hours of custody. This, Haji Kaadam insisted to the American colonel, was an affront. "If there is an IED or an armed attack, that is our responsibility," he says. "But a lone woman? That is out of our hands. Yet the Iraqi Army came down here and began hitting our people, blaming them." Without ruling out that some Sons of Iraq individuals may have been involved, Colonel Rohling's intelligence officers and the Iraqi Army continue to investigate the woman's identity and motivation. He has no proof yet, but Rohling suspects the attack was a personal vendetta against the captain because the woman targeted him so specifically. "She could have done so much more damage to the Iraqis, or the Americans, for that matter, if she had chosen to," he says.

Colonel Rohling has been circulating throughout the area ever since the bombing, talking to sheiks and Iraqi Army units, encouraging them not to let emotions escalate, making sure everyone is seeking answers, not vengeance. "This week has been about throwing a wet blanket on things, just trying to calm everyone down," says Major Bill Kuttler, the unit's operations officer. Today, Colonel Rohling has arrived with the wet blanket in full effect, telling Haji Kaadam that the soldiers reacted strongly because they loved their commander, but the Iraqi Army commander realizes "seeking justice does not involve trampling on the rights of the Qarghuli people."

At the Iraqi Army base where the captain was killed, Rohling drives this point home. "You need to strike a balance when you deal with the Qarghuli," he tells two junior Iraqi Army officers. "I understand that you can't demonstrate weakness, but you can't come on too strong, either. Today is the hottest day of the year so far, but I need cool heads, okay?" They nod in agreement.

Everyone the colonel speaks to on his rounds today, whether Qarghuli or Iraqi Army, affirms that life is better now than it was even a few months ago, and they pledge that peace will be maintained. But tensions, distrust and resentments roil beneath the surface, and they can erupt quickly and intensely. Haji Kaadam says Iraqi Army vehicles scream past his checkpoints at reckless speeds and says some Army officers have been demanding that the Sons of Iraq salute them. The Iraqi Army officers, meanwhile, sneer that the Sons of Iraq are either incapable of maintaining security or, worse, provide it selectively.

As the day's meetings conclude, Colonel Rohling says, "The important thing, in the aftermath of something like this, is that we don't move backwards. We can't move forward every day, but on the days we don't, I need to make sure everybody is just taking a pause and not gearing up for a giant leap backwards."
By JIM FREDERICK/YUSUFIYAH

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the notion of community, culture and civilization

The wars arise in part from very secular fears about identity and survival. Two factors, sometimes contradictory, are at work: 1) deep, real, material interests lie just beneath the surface of most of today's ostensibly religious conflicts; 2) religion, not as a doctrinal crusade but as an identifying birthright, a heritage, is persistently present to complicate every issue, to enforce an "us-them" hostility. Religion, always a receptacle for ultimate aspirations, can enlist the best and worst in its congregations. In conflict, religion can be used—or perverted—to call up supernatural justifications for killing. In 1915 the Bishop of London asked his congregation to "kill Germans, to kill them, not for the sake of killing, but to save the world, to kill the good as well as the bad, to kill." The dark side of religious conviction can be a violent intractability, an avenging angel's note of retribution. As Martin Luther wrote, "He who will not hear God's word when it is spoken with kindness must listen to the headsman when he comes with his ax." Religion can provide a warmth of certitude and belonging. When its energy is turned outward, it may express itself in acts of mercy and even saintliness. But piety can also be lethal when directed against strangers and infidels. William James, writing 75 years ago, defined the problem: "Piety is the mask, the inner force is tribal instinct."
One writer, Miriam Reik, has claimed, "Were Ireland an African island and its natives black, no one would doubt that Ulster's troubles show the classical symptoms of a colonial struggle." That is true enough. Since the 17th century's Scottish and English Protestant settlers came to Ulster under the protection of the British Crown, the native Catholic minority has been relegated to permanently inferior status. Yet the conflict has a strong tribal aspect, with religion serving as the identifying element, even though groups such as the I.R.A. are now more likely to quote Marx than Jesus. Protestants like the demagogue Ian Paisley have kept the "religious threat" alive by constantly referring to the dangers of "popery" and "Romanism."
It is interesting and perhaps a bit mystifying that most of the religious struggles around the world involve Moslems. Some scholars believe such conflicts may be an expression of a resurgent Islam. Says Duke University Political Scientist Ralph Braibanti: "This may be the moment in history when money, diplomacy and strategy join together in providing a new context for the renaissance of Islamic identity and perhaps of Islam itself." Islam makes no distinction between the secular and the religious. The Moslem doctrine of jihad (holy war) has an immediate, literal significance. As the Vatican's guidelines on Islam observe, "Islam is a religion, yet it is also inextricably bound up with the notion of community, culture and civilization."

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